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Marx nowhere talked explicitly about the production of nature. But in his work there 
is an implied understanding … which leads firmly in this direction. Neil Smith 
(1984: 50). 
 
In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates 
over the rest, whose relations … assign rank and influence to all others. It is a 
general illumination which bathes all colours and modifies their particularity. Karl 
Marx (1973: 106) 
 
In a world where corporations create new life-forms and may soon geo-engineer the skies, 
does what we call ‘nature’ any longer possess autonomy and agency? In what ways, and to 
what degree, can the capitalist mode of delivering goods and services be said to ‘produce’ 
something that is, by definition, thought to be given rather than made? Is ‘nature’, in its 
various forms (large and small), something that can and should found a politics devoted to 
reforming contemporary capitalism or, perhaps, to superceding it? If not, how can the 
biophysical dimensions of capitalist accumulation be factored-in to a critique of political 
economy? This essay will address these analytical and normative questions by reviewing over 
40 years of Marxist scholarship focussed on the relationships between capitalism and what 
we by convention call nature – human and non-human.  
 Since my questions are large ones and the scholarship voluminous, I want to place the 
writings of the late geographer Neil Smith (1954-2012) at the heart of my review. Though 
Smith was only one of many Marxists who wrote about the capitalism-nature nexus, his 
several publications on the subject warrant especial attention for three reasons. First, since the 
mid-1990s they have been a key reference point for Marxist and Marxisant geographers 
seeking to more expansively ‘materialise’ Marx’s theory of capital accumulation. Second, 
even those – for the most part based outside the geography discipline – who did not engage 
with Smith’s writings in this quest, can usefully have their contributions interpreted in light 
of his striking insistence that capitalism makes even nature in its own image. The reverse 
applies too, of course: how defensible is this insistence when Smith’s work is read in light of 
some other Marxists’ belief that nature, and those who speak for it, can and do resist 
capitalism’s entreaties sui generis? Third, notwithstanding his subsequent attempts to update 
and clarify key claims about nature advanced in Uneven development (1984), a certain 
interpretive openness attaches to them. By glossing this in the search for what Smith ‘really 
intended,’ several critics – myself included some years ago (e.g. Castree, 1995) – risk 
overlooking important aspects of his thinking. We might regard these aspects as ‘productive 
ambiguities’. 
 In sum, this essay foregrounds Smith’s writings about capitalism and nature as a 
means of exploring key themes and insights in a larger corpus of Marxist work on the subject 
(what is sometimes called ‘ecoMarxism’). Though I thereby intend to pay tribute to one of 
geography’s most inspirational thinkers, my aim here is not to suggest that Smith’s 
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contributions trumped those of other Marxists similarly interested in nature. Instead, by 
reading the latter’s arguments in relation to Smith’s, I hope to shed light on important ideas 
and persistent points of analytical and normative disagreement. Given that the literature is 
now large, I will necessarily be quite selective in my coverage of writings beyond Smith’s 
own. I aim to identify contributions that are representative of key themes and issues. My 
interpretation of them, while hardly definitive, emerges from over 20 years of immersion in 
the debates about Marxism, capitalism and nature as a sometime contributor sympathetic to 
Smith’s project.  
 The chapter is organised chronologically. I begin by introducing Smith’s thesis that 
nature is produced, first put forward back in 1980 and fully articulated in his book Uneven 
Development, paying attention to the wider intellectual and political context in which he was 
writing. After this long section, I then summarise succinctly a set of other contributions to a 
then still-nascent Marxist political ecology that were published subsequent to – and usually in 
ignorance of – Smith’s thesis (roughly 1987-2000). I read these in light of Smith, and Smith 
in light of them, making retrospective connections where none (or few) were made at the time. 
I then, again telegraphically, focus on the recent (‘neoliberal’) period, in both an intellectual 
and political economic sense. I place Smith’s original thesis and his subsequent 
commentaries on it in relation to newer Marxist theories of capitalist-nature relationships and 
wider currents of thinking and politics. As I will explain, my continuous attention to context 
is of more than merely historic interest. Throughout, my overarching concern is whether and 
how a Marxist critique of political ecology can function without ‘nature’ as an ontological 
reference point for analysis and evaluation. I apologise to knowledgeable readers at the 
outset: lack of space prevents me from exploring the work I summarise here in anything like 
the detail it deserves.   
Before I get down to business, a point about terminology, one about literature omitted 
from this review, and one about the consequences of knowledge. As far as I know Smith 
never called himself a ‘political ecologist’ (even after the term caught-on in geography and 
anthropology from the early 1980s), but his disquisitions on nature clearly make a certain 
definition of the term applicable. After all, Marx’s middle and later writings – upon which 
Smith drew heavily and creatively his entire career – were billed as an exploration of the 
social definition, creation, distribution, regulation, effects and politicisation of wealth in a 
capitalist world (‘political economy’). To draw-out what Marx left largely implicit, as Smith 
and fellow travellers have done, is to show that his political economy always necessarily had 
an ecological dimension. How the biophysical realm both enables and hinders the creation, 
growth and capture of wealth in its capitalist form is a question of prime analytical and 
political importance. Indeed, though Smith rarely referred to their publications, it should 
come as no surprise that some of the pioneers of a self-designated ‘political ecology’ – such 
as Piers Blaikie (1985) – were inspired by Marx’s germinal account of the capitalist mode of 
production (see Watts, this volume). 
This reference to Blaikie’s influential work suggests strong links should exist, via 
Marx, between the writings of Smith and the field of political ecology (‘third world’ and ‘first 
world) showcased in this volume. However, these links are – surprisingly – few and far 
between. Smith’s highly theoretical treatment of Marx contrasted with the concrete, empirical 
preoccupations of Blaikie, Michael Watts and others who pioneered political ecology. 
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Though his work has been widely read by political ecologists it has rarely be used in their 
research. A full review of the way Marx’s ideas were operationalized by self-styled ‘political 
ecologists’ and elaborated by Marxists like Smith – who explored the nature question in a 
different way – remains to be written. Accordingly, when I refer to ‘political ecology’ in this 
chapter I’m referring not the field of that name but to theoretical work like Smith’s that 
examines how wealth in capitalist societies has a constitutively biophysical dimension. It is 
interesting to speculate whether and how the work I review here would have developed 
differently had its authors better engaged with Marxist political ecologists like Watts.   
As we shall see, the concepts we ultimately favour in addressing the question of 
‘capitalist nature’ significantly affect the answers Marxists like Smith have offered. Since 
capitalism is far, far more pervasive than ever it was in Marx’s day, getting these answers 
‘right’ – and inserting them into the discourses and programs of political movements – recalls 
Marx’s stirring injunction that critics must change the world, not merely aim to understand it. 
Universities are far more subject to the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of 
the state than in decades past, but they remain crucial sites for the creation of oppositional 
thinking. Without them, contemporary Marxist thought would be smaller and less 
sophisticated than it is – notwithstanding the fact that fewer academics and students are 
drawn to it than a generation ago. For Neil Smith, and I hope for readers of this essay, 
Marxism has some vital things to tell us about the ‘nature’ of our capitalist world that other 
approaches ignore, wilfully or otherwise. But these will never be verities for more than few 
unless progress can be made in the perennial battle to win the minds and hearts of enough 
people in universities and beyond. As I will show, Marxist analysis is as vibrant and incisive 
as ever, but it appears politically impotent – notwithstanding the powerful anti-capitalist 
sentiments expressed worldwide in the late 1990s and a decade later when the global 
financial crisis erupted.  
 
Denaturalising nature: Neil Smith thinking against the grain 
A distinctive perspective 
Thirty years ago Western capitalists were hunting for a cure to the wide and deep economic 
crisis that began in the early 1970s. As part of this crisis Left political organisations lost their 
former ascendancy in many countries. Meanwhile, knowledgeable observers had long 
realised that actually-existing ‘communism’ fell far short of the ideals of any credible Marxist 
revolutionary. Yet radical dreams were hardly dead: the environmental, feminist and anti-
racist movements had built-up a head of steam in many Western countries through the 1970s, 
with the ‘events’ of 1968 a still-inspirational memory. Though internally diverse, elements of 
these movements provocatively went against the grain of current thinking and practice. 
Universities afforded these New Leftists the time and space to match their political ambitions 
with powerful philosophies and theories. They also became a redoubt for Marxists trying to 
make sense of more turbulent world – one in which Marxism would, outside the universities, 
become something of a dirty word once the ‘eastern bloc’ collapsed almost over-night (1989-
91) and ‘free market capitalism’ seemed to reign triumphant in a world on the cusp of 
‘globalisation’. It was in this contradictory, febrile context that the then young Marxist 
geographer Neil Smith published a sophisticated work of abstract theory – Uneven 
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development – in 1984. As he explained on the very first page, it was an “exploration and 
critique of concepts as a means to interrogate more sharply the reality we live in” (1984: xv, 
emphasis added). 
 At the time of publication, the book was distinctive for a number of reasons, of which 
I want to highlight four. First, it had a lot to say about what we call ‘nature’ – even though 
Marx’s own comments on the subject had been most fragmentary. In fact, it was among the 
first systematic attempts to integrate biophysical phenomena into Marx’s political economy, 
linking them to space, scale and geographical inequality in the process. Prior to Smith, the 
main Marxian authors to consider Marx’s view on nature (Friedrich Engels aside) were 
Alfred Schmidt, Sebastiano Timparano, Raymond Williams and Norman Geras (see Castree, 
2000). Second, what Smith said was – to use his own words – ‘jarring’ and ‘quixotic’ because 
he claimed that nature is produced not given. To quote him at some length: 
[T]his idea … defies the conventional, sacrosanct separation of nature and 
society ... We are used to conceiving of nature as external to society, pristine and 
pre-human, or else as a grand universal in which human beings are but small and 
simple cogs. But here … our concepts have not caught up with reality. It is 
capitalism which ardently defies the inherited separation of nature and society, 
and with pride rather than shame. In its constant drive to accumulate larger and 
larger quantities of social wealth …, capital[ism] transforms the shape of the 
entire world. No God-given stone is left unturned, no original relation with 
nature unaltered, no living thing unaffected. (1984: 7-8) 
Third, Smith’s emphasis on capitalism’s transgressive powers called into question the 
deep-seated ontological assumptions underpinning both radical and more mainstream thought 
in the 1980s. His insistence that there is no nature intelligible outside contingent social 
discourses, relations and practices posed a challenge to much ‘environmentalist’ thinking, to 
politics and policies predicated on ideas of ‘human nature’ (mental and/or physical), and to 
the idea that ‘natural science’ (including physical geography) studies an intrinsically asocial 
world (leaving social scientists and humanists – including human geographers – to study 
everything else). As Smith explained in chapter 1 of his book, analytical and normative 
references to nature (without the scare-quotes) are ideological, both in the sense of misleading 
and actively reproductive of capitalist society. I will say more about why presently. Finally, 
while this claim about ideology presaged later writings by post- or non-Marxists about the 
‘discursive construction’ and ‘cultural constitution’ of ‘nature’, Smith refused to limit nature’s 
social character to linguistic frames or semiotic sieves. 
Understanding ‘production’ 
What exactly did Smith mean by ‘production’? At the heart of his conception were the terms 
metabolism and labour (1984: 33-4). The former, far more than a word like ‘interaction’, 
posits what we call ‘people and environment’ or ‘society and nature’ as unities not dualities. 
As Smith argued, “Society is internal to nature” (1984: 33). For him, and for Marx, the motor 
of this internalisation is humans’ propensity to make the material world into things of use and 
to thereby alter their own physical and mental ‘nature’. Chapter 2 of Uneven Development 
explores this in some conceptual detail. In a section on ‘Production in general’ he makes the 
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key point that all work involves not just a relation with what we call nature (e.g. with water, 
soil or cattle), but with other people. The latter condition how work is performed, what it is in 
‘external nature’ that is deemed useful, and how ‘human nature’ is thereby altered by the 
collective results of work. This immediately alerts us to the idea that all ‘production’ of goods 
and services extends beyond the physical act of individuals wresting useful items out of the 
non-human world in particular locations. In this light, we might say that metabolism alerts us 
to flows (of energy, ideas and materials), and labour to the key relations determining the 
specific pattern of those flows (metaphorical pipes or wires, if you will). 
 How, then, is production organised in capitalism? The answer culminates chapter 2 of 
Smith’s book. Like all modes of production capitalism proliferates use values (qualitatively 
specific entities designed to be of practical or symbolic utility). But since it is not a 
subsistence economy, useful items are produced in order to be exchanged. Exchanged for 
what? After Marx, Smith argues that the answer is money. For workers this is essential 
because in capitalism they are wage-workers, i.e. they must sell their capacity to work in 
exchange for a salary they can use to purchase the goods and services to reproduce themselves 
physically and psychologically. For capitalists – who own the ‘forces of production’ (e.g. 
factories) – it is essential for a different reason. Yes, they must sell enough products to pay for 
their own socio-physical reproduction; but they must also accumulate (or borrow) enough 
money to ensure future rounds of commodity production. This is more than a question of 
covering their production costs: capitalists do not go the trouble of employing workers, and 
paying for material inputs, premises and equipment, with no expectation of a return on 
investment. Instead, they aim to accumulate more money than they laid-out at the start of each 
production round. And since they must compete with other capitalists for market share they 
are compelled to innovate in any number of ways (e.g. inventing new use values, reducing 
production costs, expanding into overseas markets, or creating new demand niches in existing 
markets). In short, the ensemble of social relations specific to capitalism – relations of 
ownership, exchange and competition – ensure that ‘accumulation for accumulation’s sake’ is, 
as Smith wrote, “… a socially imposed necessity” (1984: 70). These relations make 
expanding circulation – the entry of entities, goods and people into, along and out of various 
commodity chains – the economic norm.  
Quite aside from the fact that it confronts workers, capitalists and everyone else as an 
impersonal force eluding control, and quite aside from its contradictory character (e.g. tending 
towards boom and bust periods), there is for Smith (after Marx) something else peculiar about 
capitalist production in this expanded sense. It is that one commodity (wage labour) is, in fact, 
the source of the wealth represented by the money that capitalists devote their energies to 
accumulating. Contra mainstream economic thinking, commodities do not have ‘intrinsic 
value’, value is not merely ‘conferred’ by consumers’ preferences, and nor does profit 
originate from the skill or efficiency of specific capitalists. As Marx explained in his ‘labour 
theory of value’ – still controversial among analysts to this day – workers collectively create 
and unconsciously alienate social wealth by way of a process that conceals the fact and 
operates ‘behind their backs’. His concepts of fetishism, concrete labour, abstract labour, 
socially necessary labour time, and surplus value were key to this theory of how commodities 
(pre-eminently money) are the material form assumed by social relations and the cloak hiding 
the transfer of social wealth between classes. In this light, capitalism’s differentia specifica is 
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that tendentially growing (and empirically changing) flows of energy, ideas and materials are 
both compelled by, and a displaced form of, particular inter- and intra-relations among two 
social classes. Here metabolism is unique because specific acts of work are profoundly 
conditioned by real, but abstract, social forces ‘stretched-out’ over time and terrestrial space. 
It is special too because at one level capitalism is tediously changeless yet, at another, 
extraordinarily dynamic.  
In light of all this, it might seem perfectly reasonable to argue that capitalism ‘utilises’, 
‘relies upon’ and often ‘destroys’ what we call ‘nature’ on an expanding scale – but not that 
that it produces it. After all, as Smith conceded in Uneven Development, “Nature is generally 
seen as precisely that which cannot be produced” (1984: 49). Furthermore, the just-mentioned 
concept of metabolism and Marx’s/Smith’s emphasis on relations apparently point us towards 
a process whereby various different and discrete entities (non-human and human) connect 
with and co-constitute each other in historically and geographically specific ways. Yet Smith 
held-fast to the idea of production his entire career, and in a seemingly literal not 
metaphorical sense. “Where capitalism is unique”, he wrote 30 years ago, “is that for the first 
time human beings produce nature at a world scale” (1984: 77). What is more, he considered 
– and then dismissed – the argument that because some parts of ‘nature’ are not socially 
produced (e.g. lava, our brains or gravity) the idea of production must be carefully 
circumscribed: 
 
… these rather extreme examples hardly testify to the falsity of the ‘production 
of nature’ thesis, especially when one looks at more down-to-earth examples of 
supposedly unproduced nature, such as Yellowstone Park or Yosemite (1984: 
80).  
 
Even though key natural resources appeared suddenly scarce (again) after 2000 (e.g. oil), 
and humans powerless to arrest the future effects of past greenhouse gas emissions, Smith did 
not back-track: “[T]he production of nature”, he wrote in his final major essay on the subject, 
“is being dramatically intensified and its dimensions multiplied” (2007: 21). As Julie 
Guthman recently noted, “In effect, the production of nature thesis flipped materialism on its 
head, by repositioning nature as an outcome of social relations rather than an asocial input to 
the economy” (2011: 235).  
 
Why disavow human and non-human nature? 
Why was Smith such a fierce critic of the idea that ‘nature’ has an autonomous existence, 
agency or moral-ethical consider-ability – especially given how prominent ‘environmentalism’ 
in its various forms had become in the years when Smith was researching and writing Uneven 
Development? We can only speculate, but I would point to two aspects of the context in which 
he crystallised his ideas. Both, in part, were reactions to the nature-society dualism that had 
long organised thinking in Smith’s own discipline of geography. 
 First, Smith’s doctoral thesis advisor was David Harvey, who undoubtedly exerted a 
huge influence on his thinking. In 1974 Harvey published what, in time, became a germinal 
Marxist critique of the neo-Malthusian thinking. Such thinking formed a key strand of the 
just-mentioned environmentalism that arose because of perceived resource scarcities and 
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anthropogenic destruction of species and ecosystems. Harvey took strong issue with the idea, 
popularised by the likes of American biologist Paul Ehrlich, that the world was ‘over-
populated’. Instead of highlighting ‘natural limits’ to economic growth, Harvey ‘denaturalised’ 
and relativized the question of how the biophysical world affects the social one. For him, 
problems of human poverty and scarcity reflected the systematic maldistribution of material 
wealth (e.g. food) because of unequal transfers of social wealth (represented by money) – 
such that ‘limits to growth’ were internal to capitalism.  
 Second, while Harvey’s attention was directed at ‘natural resources’, he did not focus 
on ‘natural hazards’, such as hurricanes or tsunamis. These periodic threats to people were 
surely independent of any social conditioning. Yet in a 1976 Nature paper, the geographers 
Phil O’Keefe, Ken Westgate and Ben Wisner sought, as per their title, to take ‘the naturalness 
out of natural disasters’ (again, see Watts, this volume). Noting that more people than ever 
were being badly affected by extreme biophysical events, they pointed to the socio-economic 
and political processes that rendered some vulnerable but not others. This led them to suggest 
that avoiding settling in hazardous areas or spending more money on technical solutions (e.g. 
flood barriers) was not necessarily the best response. Instead, they argued that attempts to 
address poverty and social marginalisation would render the worst affected groups more 
resilient to biophysical extremes. These extremes were thus experienced contingently, not as 
absolutes. Smith was undoubtedly aware of this argument: four years later he and O’Keefe 
(1980) together authored the very first presentation of the ‘production of nature’ thesis in 
Antipode. 
 In this light, it is not hard to see why Smith – to use the words of a later associate 
echoing Raymond Williams – believed that “ideas the draw upon the authority of nature 
nearly always have their origin in ideas about society” (Ross, 1994: 15). Here I return to the 
subject of ‘ideology’, mentioned in passing earlier. For Smith, references to a supposedly 
society-free nature not only served to anchor and legitimate all manner of capitalist projects, 
such as cures for ‘genetic diseases’ in humans marketed by biotechnology corporations. More 
than this, they were – and remain – the conceptual mirror of the everyday forms in which 
capitalism presents itself (see chapter 1 of Uneven development for more on this). For the 
mode of production that takes hold of ‘nature’ in all its forms does not make plain the 
ramified and complex flows and relations that comprise it. Instead, Smith argued, it manifests 
as a world of entities – things, people, and so on – that may be conjoined but appear to exist 
regardless of any particular connections established between them. For Smith the job of 
Marxism is to contest the appearance and show that ‘the question of nature’, whatever else it 
may be, is really a question of how any society defines, creates, and distributes the wealth that 
sustains it. The normative up-shot is to ask not what nature prevents or enables, but to 
consider how ‘nature’ might be produced in ways more democratic, more just and more 
subject to collective control (see Biro, 2005). 
 
Placing analytical limits on ‘the production of nature’? 
As we have seen, Smith appeared to believe that capitalist nature was produced ‘all the way 
down’. This testified to how powerfully Hegelian holism, materialised by Marx, permeated 
his thinking. In this he presaged neo-Marxist Steven Vogel’s plenary argument in Against 
Nature that what “we take for granted as ‘natural’ turns out on investigation to be the product 
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of human labor and hence literally socially constructed” (1996: 7). Yet in Uneven 
development, and subsequent essays, close readers could (can) spot some signs of 
equivocation. For instance, Smith observed that “Unlike gravity, there is nothing natural 
about the ‘law’ of value” (1984: 82) – a statement which posits the very distinction his book 
was intended to challenge. Similarly, in a chapter published the following decade, he said of 
his ‘thesis’ that “If it indulges a certain anthropomorphism, … it expresses the extent to which 
advanced capitalist societies have intruded human activity at the centre of nature” (1996: 50). 
Here the image of ‘intrusion’ and the concept of the ‘anthropos’ both suggest/ed a residual 
Kantianism (or, if one prefers, Cartesianism) that Smith otherwise dissented from. 
Was Smith simply inconsistent, or did his apparent vacillation reflect something 
important about late twentieth century capitalism? After all, by the mid-1990s biotechnology 
firms were routinely crossing species barriers at the genetic level with considerable precision. 
Meanwhile, a new and thoroughly global regime of capital accumulation seemed both to 
exhaust nature’s bounty (e.g. oceanic fish stocks) and to overestimate the environment’s 
capacity to absorb waste (witness ozone layer thinning and ‘global warming’, both of which 
were headline news not long after Uneven Development was published). Perhaps capitalism 
produced some natures but not others, meaning that Smith (and other Marxists) needed a 
more differentiated sense of the natural according to (i) its malleability and (ii) which 
capitalist were seeking to profit from its use. A number of analysts, though working 
separately, together addressed this need. None paid particular attention to Smith’s thesis, but 
their use of Marxian concepts makes it easy enough to establish the connections with 
hindsight. I will focus briefly on seven published contributions, organising them into two 
clusters. 
 
The uneven internalisation of ‘nature’ by capitalism: biophysical barriers and opportunities 
The first five pertain to the analysis of agriculture and the question of how capitalists explore 
new frontiers in their desire for profit. Like mining, fisheries, forestry and other natural 
resource industries, agriculture must ‘confront nature directly’. In what became a classic 
intervention, the rural sociologists Susan Mann and James Dickinson (1978) argued that 
agriculture’s economic ‘exceptionalism’ – that is, its historic resistance to capitalist social 
relationships – had something to do with its biophysical basis. For instance, the naturally-
determined gap between investment and work (e.g. buying a tractor and sowing seeds), and 
return on investment (because food-stuffs take time to grow) can make agriculture 
unattractive to capitalist entrepreneurs. Following Marx, and his epigones Karl Kautsky and V. 
I. Lenin, Dickinson codified and elaborated this argument in Agrarian Capitalism in Theory 
and Practice (1990). The ‘obstacle’ of nature, she showed, helped explain why agriculture 
remained dominated by rentiers, families and various small holders. 
Yet these obstacles, others showed, were not all of a piece. In their book From 
Farming to Biotechnology, neo-Marxist agro-food analysts Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson 
(1987) focussed on how capitalist firms had ‘taken hold’ of some aspects of agriculture. They 
focussed on ‘appropriation’ – manufacturing things farmers needed (e.g. combine harvesters) 
by altering their sense of what precisely they need – and ‘substitution’ – replacing on-farm 
inputs to farming (e.g. cow manure) with manufactured ones (e.g. chemical fertiliser). The 
same year, Marxist rural sociologist Jack Kloppenberg showed how both processes had 
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unfolded historically in the United States in his monograph First the Seed (1987). In effect, 
his account of how agricultural science and democratically-elected government had indirectly 
founded a new set of private firms supplying genetically altered seeds (and other inputs) to 
farmers year-on-year was an illustration of ‘the production of nature’ in all but name. At both 
a discursive and physical level, Kloppenberg showed, these firms created new commodities 
that circumvented previous biological obstacles to agrarian accumulation (see Castree, 2001). 
Capitalist production in an expanded sense here produced ‘nature’ in a concrete sense. 
All this suggested that capital literally circulated through some elements of nature but 
had to circulate around others, depending on prevailing technology. In his magisterial book 
about the growth of large-scale agriculture in California, geographer George Henderson 
(1999) evidenced the latter in compelling detail. He showed how ‘finance capital’ (banks, in 
this case) made money by extending credit to aspiring commercial farmers confronting the 
barriers to accumulation Mann and Dickinson had identified. The banks thereby enabled the 
intrusion of ‘productive capital’ into farming, notwithstanding the obstacles, and made money 
in the process. As Henderson argued in a trailer essay for his book, the point “is that nature 
repels and attracts capital in different ways according the historical … contingen[cies]” (1998: 
76). This enjoins us to attend to different circuits and sectors of capital, and – if we broaden 
the point beyond agriculture and money-lending – the differential affordances nature presents 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Capitalism’s biophysical outsides 
Few, if any, of the contributions just mentioned paid attention to the concerns expressed by 
environmentalists from the early 1970s onwards. Additionally, their analyses were focussed 
on aspects of nature deemed directly ‘useful’ by capitalists and others. However, what about 
all those elements of nature, from fresh water to oxygen to human intelligence, that capitalism 
treated as ‘free inputs’ or else as ‘sinks’ for the release of the bi-products of production? This 
question preoccupied a group of what became known as ‘eco-Marxists’. Their aim, achieved 
differently in the detail, was two-fold: first, to explain how and why capitalism was 
systematically degrading the biophysical basis of its own existence; second, to thereby 
explain to Marxists and left-leaning environmentalists alike that they needed to make 
common political cause. 
 It will suffice to point to two authors who, like Smith, drew directly on Marx’s 
original writings in presenting their late 20th century critique of capitalism-nature 
relationships. In The Future of the Market German Elmar Altvater attended to the “largely 
neglected dimension of economic processes [whereby] … transformations [are] undergone by 
raw materials and energy in the course of production, consumption and distribution” (1993: p. 
5) – ignored, that is, by mainstream economists and Marxists alike (in his view). He placed 
capitalist labour – in both its concrete and abstract senses – at the heart of these 
transformations, highlighting the partial way ‘nature’ registers as use values: 
 
Nothing can be defined as a use-value … without regard to the … biotic and abiotic 
environment. But this is precisely what happens if it becomes a bearer of value and 





On this basis Altvater identified “five dimensions of the contradiction between ecology and 
economics” (p. 198) arising from a clash of the “ordering principles” (p. 204) governing 
capital accumulation, on the one hand, and a nature not designed for use by capitalism on the 
other. 
 Independently of Altvater, American Marxist James O’Connor was making similar 
arguments. Assembled in his 1998 book Natural Causes, O’Connor’s many essays presented 
the concepts of ‘conditions of production’, ‘under-production’ and ‘second contradiction of 
capitalism’ – all of which have since become influential in certain Marxist circles. The first 
pointed to all those things (biophysical and social) upon which capitalism relies at any one 
moment but which it had no hand in (re)producing. The second pointed to these things’ 
scarcity once capitalists utilise them as if they are limitless. This scarcity results in rising costs, 
new regulatory requirements (imposed by governments) and other burdens that are not 
shouldered by capitalists alone and may become politicised. The third concept pointed to an 
‘ecological dialectic’ arising from capitalism’s engagement with nature. O’Connor regarded 
this as just as important as Marx’s ‘first contradiction’ between the ‘relations and forces of 
production’. Accordingly, he suggested that radical environmentalists should join trades 
unions, communist organisations and others in any revolt against capitalism. ‘Green’ politics 
needs to be ‘red’, and vice versa.  
 From Altvater’s and O’Connor’s perspective, Smith’s thesis – had they engaged with 
it at the time – would doubtless have appeared more metaphorical than literal: for them, we 
might say, capitalism treats all nature as if it is (or can be) ‘produced’, yet eventually runs-up 
against the physical contradictions and political backlash this creates. This arguably reflects 
the influence of neo-Marxist historian Karl Polanyi (1944) on their work. Polanyi’s concept of 
‘fictitious commodities’ pointed to all those things – values, relations, institutions, norms and 
physical entities – whose characteristics exceeded those ‘demanded’ by capitalism at any one 
time. 
 
An imagined Smithian response 
How might Smith have responded to the slew of Marxian work summarised in the two sub-
sections above? I say ‘might’ because in neither of his two substantial 1990s essays about 
nature (Smith, 1996, 1998) did he refer much to any of this scholarship. The seemingly 
equivocal Smith, with which I introduced this section, might have appreciated the qualifiers 
everyone from Mann to O’Connor introduced to the question of capitalist nature. He might 
have applauded the way a politics of class was thus shown to be wedded to a politics of nature, 
especially given that trades unions and socialist political parties were no longer in the 
vanguard after the economic crises of the 1970s and 80s.  
However, the apparently unequivocal Smith of the previous section would surely have 
argued something else: namely, that these authors (re)imported ideological thinking into 
Marxism by implying that much of ‘nature’ can be understood as possessing ‘independent’ 
qualities that capital either cannot profit from, circulates around or ignores at its peril. He had 
criticised Alfred Schmidt (1971), one of the first to systematically theorise nature as a Marxist, 
on just these grounds (see chapter 1 of Uneven development). Against any “neo-Kantian 
revival” (1998: 266), as he called it, we need, he argued, to resist “the fetishism of nature” 
11 
 
(1996: 51) evident in both the environmental movement and attempts to ‘green’ capitalism 
from the early 1990s (witness The Nature Company: see Smith, 1996: 36-9, 51-2).  
It is with the unequivocal Smith that I wish now to end this chapter. As I will explain, 
a critique of capitalist nature can proceed under the sign of ‘production’ without falling prey 
to a tabula rasa argument (‘capitalism can produce nature willy-nilly’) and without, on the 
other hand, appealing to aspects of ‘nature’ that supposedly exist outside the production 
process. But this ‘both/and’ view necessitates understanding production in a broader sense 
than the literal fabrication of things like genetically modified organisms. Misinterpreting this 
breadth as covering nature ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to capitalism is, I believe, why Neil Smith 
can be misread as a ‘hyper-constructionist’ who accords ‘nature’ neither agency nor moral 
worth. 
 
Capitalism, nature and radical politics in the Anthropocene 
 
Contextual considerations 
The early 21st century has been exceedingly eventful. First, earlier warnings about the 
magnitude of ‘global environmental change’ have been repeated more loudly. Recent IPCC 
reports foresee ‘dangerous climate change’ if runaway atmospheric pollution is not abated, 
while a network of environmental scientists proclaim the recent period of Earth history (the 
Holocene) over: people are now, they argue, equivalent to the ‘great forces of nature’, such is 
‘the human impact’. Second, this has given environmental politics a boost of sorts, and comes 
after the wave of anti-capitalist protests that helped to re-politicise this mode of production 
from the late 1990s. Third, the global financial crisis of 2008-9 reignited these protests and 
offered widespread  opportunities to think about a more humane, eco-friendly capitalism (if 
not its outright replacement). ‘Decarb-onising’ capitalism has become a seeming priority, and 
many identify the massive stored energy of fossil fuels as the motor that has carelessly driven 
it forward this last 150 years (see Huber, 2013).  
However, and fourthly, critics suggest that the sting of radical thinking has been 
drawn, or simply ignored, by the powers that be. Despite the Rio+20 Earth Summit, 
‘environmental issues’ have slid down the agendas of most major governments (witness the 
dismal international attempts to curb greenhouse gas emissions). Meanwhile, environmental 
economics and broader neoliberal policies now seemingly dominate attempts to give the 
invisible hand a ‘green thumb’. Everything, even a ‘nature’ recognised as in need of better 
‘management’, must conform to the imperative of economic growth in these times of 
recession and austerity. What’s more, some capitalists remain determined to physically 
remake nature, rather than ‘adapt’ to it, as they harness the latest science to their profit-
seeking ventures. Noted American biotechologist and businessman Craig Venter is, one might 
say, the poster child of this attempt to denaturalise ever more matter. Fifth, despite the evident 
problems with contemporary capitalism (environmental and otherwise), the relevance of 
Marxism is not widely appreciated outside (or often within) universities where people like me 
ply my trade. Furthermore, because ‘environmental issues’ are widely understood to be 
serious ones, it is likely that future attempts to popularise the Marxian critique will fare best if 
they speak to these issues and the political responses they have inspired. 
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In this context, Smith’s idea of the production of nature may, as it approaches middle 
age, appear ‘jarring’ and ‘quixotic’ for all the wrong reasons. Unless carefully qualified, it 
seems unable to speak the plethora of analytical and normative questions pertaining to a world 
of dwindling oil supplies and higher ambient temperatures. The context has changed and so, 
perhaps, should our assessment of what value Smith’s thesis (any longer) possesses. Even if 
one appreciates its analytical thrust, its refusal to grant the category of ‘nature’ political 
potency appears to make it irrelevant to the many radicals who want to protect, defend, restore 
and preserve whales or ice sheets. 
 
A renaturalised Marxism? 
Given all this we can see the appeal of more recent work by certain Marxist political 
ecologists. Chief among them is John Bellamy Foster and his associates. Their idea of a 
‘metabolic rift’ between capitalism and the biophysical world has become well-known and 
influential in some Marxist academic circles. Though they acknowledge the specific and 
contingent character of all human-environment relationships, in The Ecological Rift: 
Capitalism’s War on the Earth (Foster et al. 2010) they suggest that capitalism is pushing the 
Earth’s biophysical systems beyond their capacity to function. In a recent essay Foster (2012) 
refers to the new scientific idea of ‘planetary boundaries’ (of which there are said to be nine) 
to describe this capacity. This argument echoes those made by Altvater and O’Connor. 
However, Foster and his associates focus more on “high impact planetary ecological crises” 
(ibid. 16), thus mirroring the Earth-system focus of many campaigning environmental 
scientists like James Hansen and Manchester University’s Kevin Anderson.  
 This focus seems apropo. It serves as a corrective to the ‘Prometheanism’ and 
‘utopianism’ some critics detect in earlier strands of Marxist political ecology (see Soper, 
1991 and Benton, 1991 ). Yes, we live in world where capitalist firms can remake nature 
forensically, but it is also one where capitalism’s unintended ‘environmental externalities’ 
must be acknowledged and arrested for fear of massive and uncontrollable Earth-system 
changes. Indeed, high-level discussions of ‘green capitalism’ show that even (some) 
capitalists realise that ‘the second contradiction’ is no figment of the Marxist imagination. So 
how can Smith’s critique of neo-Kantianism remain in-tact given the ‘fact’ of our 
Anthropocene condition? Surely Marxist analysis and politics must reckon with nature’s 
agency at the largest scale? 
 Since Smith himself provided an answer to these questions we do not, fortunately, 
have to speculate. In Socialist Register 2007 (Smith, 2006) and the ‘Afterword’ to edition 3 of 
Uneven Development (Smith, 2008) he addressed the new way ‘nature’ was being mobilised 
by capitalist elites, by environmentalists and by certain Marxists. Two arguments stand out. 
First, he identified ‘nature-washing’ as “the process in which social transformations of nature 
are well enough acknowledged, but in which that socially changed nature becomes a new 
super-determinant of our social fate” (2008: 245). Nature (external and/or universal) here 
becomes an ontological reference point justifying arguments for ‘carbon offsetting’ or, more 
radically, ‘the revenge of Gaia’. Either way, Smith argued, its invocation fails to properly 
politicise capitalism, since the problem is not ‘technology’, ‘over-consumption’ or over seven 
billion human mouths to feed. Equally, the solution is not simply ‘clean technology’, less 
consumption and fewer babies. 
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Second, Smith argued that – notwithstanding the widespread recognition that nature 
needs better looking after – capitalism today 
 
absorbs nature more fully and completely ... For all that capitalism is more 
voracious than ever in vacuuming a supposedly external nature in search of 
commodifiable use values, we can also glimpse the starts of a new …regime 
whereby the task of producing a useable nature begins to pass from so-called 
external to social nature. (2006: 26)   
 
How, we might ask, are capitalist attempts to price (and profit from) environmental ‘bads’ 
and ‘goods’ (aka ‘services’) a form of ‘production’? Smith’s answer is that these goods and 
bads are not, in the end, ‘natural’ – though they are clearly anchored in real biophysical 
phenomena. Instead, they are phenomena framed discursively and practically by capitalists, 
usually working hand-in-hand with various field scientists. To bear ‘value’ in the Marxist 
sense, Smith argued, what we call nature becomes visible in circumscribed ways that are 
governed by capital’s ‘laws of motion’ – even when it is nature’s ‘real qualities’ that are 
supposedly being valued for their own sake or for non-economic reasons (see Robertson 
[2012] for more on this). A critique of capitalist political ecology cannot thus fall prey to its 
own kind of ‘nature-washing’, even as it objects to the way capitalism virtually usurps the 
power to determine our relation with the non-human world and our own corporeality (see 
Bakker and Bridge, 2006). Much of the new ‘critical resource geography’ aims to strike this 
balance (see the chapters by Bakker, Loftus, Mansfield, Prudham and Robertson this volume).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some big questions all-too-briefly. I have ignored relevant 
literatures about environmental in/justice and ecological economics. I have also ignored the 
writings of many talented (neo-)Marxists writing about nature, among them Karen Bakker, 
Ted Benton, Uli Brand, Gavin Bridge, Dan Buck, Stephen Bunker, Paul Burkett, Bram 
Buscher, Esteve Corbera, Gareth Dale, Peter Dickens, Michael Ekers, Vinay Gidwani, Matt 
Huber, Ray Hudson, Maria Kaika, Joel Kovel, Mazan Labban, Richard Levins, Richard 
Lewontin, Alain Lipietz, Alex Loftus, Minqi Li, James McCarthy, Philip McMichael, Jason 
Moore, Sandra Moog, Martin O’Connor, Tom Perreault, Scott Prudham, Morgan Robertson, 
Allan Schnaiberg, Richard Smith, Erik Swyngedouw, Richard Walker and Michael Watts 
(the list goes on). But, by focussing on Neil Smith’s notion of nature’s ‘production’ in 
relation to a selection of other Marxist writings, I have gone some way to addressing key 
analytical and normative issues subtending the work of these authors. Is ‘nature’ internal or 
external to capitalism (or both), a constraint or opportunity (or both)?; is it the ‘enemy of 
nature’ and if so what sort of ‘nature’?; and what should a ‘politics of nature’ look like in the 
critique of capital? As is now plain, I believe Smith’s notion has analytical merit, while its 
political message is hopeful: for him, we can (and should) change our collective relation with 
what we call nature, but not because of any ‘objective’ imperatives emanating from the 
biophysical world. Analytically, the challenge is to find a way of registering ‘the difference 
that nature’ makes to all our lives while avoiding recourse to all those dualisms that have 
organised Western thought for centuries. Arguably, that challenge is being met in much of the 
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recent research reviewed in this Handbook, even if – as I said at the outset – the sort of 
‘political ecology’ practiced by Smith largely ran parallel to the evolution of political ecology 
as a field. 
 Finally, what of politics and action? After all, Marxism famously aspires to change 
the world not only to understand it. Smith’s arguments arguably remain too counter-intuitive 
to be of service in politics outside the academy. ‘Production’, conventionally understood, 
seems a strange concept – a peculiar metaphor even – to organise an ecologically-aware anti-
capitalist discourse. Moreover, like many academic Marxists writing about nature, Smith 
wrote virtually nothing about real politik: how, practically, might the social relation with 
‘nature’ be changed for the better? Interestingly, certain strands of environmental and body-
politics operative outside universities are now dispensing with ‘nature’ as an ontological 
referent (see, for example, Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2007). In a generic sense, this 
mirrors Smith’s insistence that we need new terms of radical political discourse. The 
challenge, though, is to find a lexicon that resonates in everyday life without becoming 
assimilated to a soft reformism that does nothing to reign-in capitalism’s appetite to 
commodity everything. Whatever happens, biophysical questions – questions of ice sheets, 
sea levels, atmospheric, temperature, genes, fresh water, and much else besides – will be 
absolutely central to politics (mainstream and radical) in the 21st century. How those 
questions are answered discursively and practically may, literally, determine the future of life 
on this planet. Can Marxists provide solutions that have mass appeal without invoking 
‘common sense’ terms like ‘nature’? Notwithstanding the bad name capitalism currently has 
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